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Social complexity involves inter-relationships between various actors 
and systems that enjoy considerable autonomy to define their own interests 
and operating procedures. This provides a backdrop for the development 
of models of social coordination that combine autonomous actors and 
systems pursuing coherent objectives. Drawing on examples from Chile, 
this article reviews: (i) policy-network models (public works concession 
system); (ii) deliberation systems (presidential advisory commissions); and 
(iii) reflexive law systems (international trade arbitration). It is found that 
the high level of reflexiveness of these models makes it possible, albeit 
with limitations, to combine principles of autonomy and coherence in the 
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I
introduction
From sociological point of  view, one of  the most 
characteristic processes in contemporary society is 
its growing trend towards greater social complexity 
(Habermas, 1990; Luhmann, 2007). This can be 
described in three dimensions:
(i) At a practical level, it involves the proliferation 
of multiple private, public, quasi-private or semi-
public organizations; national and supra-national 
corporate stakeholders; transnational protest 
movements; local or regional representative 
groupings; and an individualized mode of 
participation in a variety of differentiated social 
spaces that are not always consistent but often 
fragmented.
(ii) In the social dimension, the trend towards 
greater complexity (hereinafter referred to as 
“complexification”) means that each of these fields 
organizes itself  on the basis of its own interests 
and operating procedures, the most likely outcome 
of which is a collision of substantive interests 
and conflicts between each field’s procedures. 
(iii) Lastly, in a temporal dimension, increasing 
social complexification means that substantive 
interests and their related procedures establish 
precise temporal priorities with their own self-
regulating mechanisms to achieve the fulfilment 
of their own objectives, pursuant to requirements 
ensuring the continuity of each field. 
In a word, complexification involves the 
differentiation of contemporary society in terms of 
systems and actors that have increasingly autonomous 
expectations and operating procedures.
Latin America, and Chile in particular, have not 
been immune from this complexification process. In 
Chile, over the last three decades at least, classical 
labour-union organizations and grassroots actors have 
been joined by a variety of new groupings based on 
diverse interests: youth groups, senior-citizen groups, 
feminists, homosexuals, migrants, environmentalists, 
local community groupings; activists in the fields of 
urban, consumer, human and citizens rights and others 
of a neo-religious nature; artistic communities, and 
various types of indigenous and student movements. 
In addition to this, public agencies have diversified 
to serve the interests of these actors (new ministries, 
under-secretariats, superintendencies, regulatory 
bodies); mechanisms such as negotiating forums, expert 
committees, study commissions, ethical commissions; 
and a proliferation of so-called third sector organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (ngos), national and 
transnational economic organizations, and diverse 
private agents operating in various transnational social 
fields (Domingues, 2008).
All of this concrete diversification of systems, 
organizations, and actors spawns substantively 
mutually contradictory interests, which gain 
autonomy by establishing their own operating 
procedures and temporal agendas to achieve 
their expectations. This begs the question as to the 
State’s capacity to use public policies to absorb 
and articulate various demands that are mutually 
conflictive and have expectations of fulfilment 
that do not allow much temporal flexibility. The 
concept of public policies can be seen as a set of 
administrative and legal measures deployed within 
the State framework to address social problems 
and guide agents towards certain forms of conduct 
(Kraft and Furlong, 2009).
In the twentieth century, public policies in 
Chile followed contradictory models in different 
historical periods: one of these was of the centrist-
state type, involving considerable State intervention 
of a developmentalist orientation, based on planning 
and aimed at incorporating the middle classes and 
low-income sectors (1932-1973). Another model 
was defined by the withdrawal of the State and an 
emphasis on macroeconomic policies (1973-1989) 
(Arellano, 1985). The ensuing period was characterized 
by a dual movement: firstly, the (political) attempt to 
return to the pre-1973 centrist-state formulas and, the 
structural impossibility of doing so in a model based 
on neoliberal reforms. This can be seen particularly in 
the domains of education, labour, collective goods and 
services, health, pensions and social security systems, 
all of which involve high levels of privatization in their 
mode of operation (Hecht-Oppenheim, 1993). 
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The hypothesis of this article is that, given the 
impossibility of  recreating a centrist-state matrix 
based on public-policy planning, and the high level 
of autonomy gained by different systems and actors, 
a new alternative for deploying public policies started 
to emergein Chile from 1990 onwards, in which State’s 
guiding role uses public policies to combine the 
coordination of systems and actors (unlike centrist-
state intervention), with substantive interests and 
autonomous operating procedures.
To develop this hypothesis, this article firstly 
identifies the key elements of  a view of  social 
coordination implemented through public policies 
in complex settings (section II). It then reviews three 
coordination models, in terms of their theoretical 
underpinnings and examples relating to their 
emergence in Chile: the policy networks model for the 
case of the public works concessions system (section 
III); the deliberation systems model for the case of 
presidential advisory commissions (section IV); and 
the reflexive law or options policy model in the case 
of arbitration on trade issues (section V). The article 
ends with a provisional assessment of these models 
in Latin America (section VI).
II
key elements for a social coordination 
perspective 
Drawing on principles of consistency and autonomy, 
Norbert Lechner (1997) has identified three basic 
forms of social coordination: political coordination, 
market coordination, and coordination by networks. 
Characteristics of  the first include centralization, 
hierarchy, and an exclusively public orientation; 
the second form is identified by its decentralized, 
horizontal, and non-directed nature. The third 
form, which combines vertical and horizontal 
communication, involves reciprocal dependency, 
and aims to articulate interests in a common subject 
through competitive cooperation. This article reserves 
the term “coordination” solely for the third case. 
Expanding this concept to embrace hierarchical-state 
regulation and market modes merely dilutes its specific 
and innovative nature. What Lechner calls “political 
coordination” has generally been recognized as State 
intervention or social control (Beyme, 1994); and, 
for the case of “market coordination”, Hayek (1986) 
referred to “Catallactics” or market self-regulation. 
The fact that market agents also display autonomy 
of interests and procedures, makes them a case for 
analysis, rather than the social coordination paradigm. 
Coordination, in the sense used here, only arises 
when some public or private agent seeks to relegate 
the autonomous dynamic of actors and systems by 
directing their performances in practical, social, and 
temporal terms.
The concept of coordination as proposed thus 
needs to be distinguished from other models of 
public-private relations: 
(i) Developmentalist interventionism, the preferred 
model in the Latin American context for much 
of the twentieth century, which involves State 
control of the productive structure.
(ii) Corporatist control, which is distinguished by 
State co-option and the definition of objectives 
and orientations for the action of private agents 
(visible in populist settings). 
(iii) Normative institutionalism, which pertains 
to analyses of conflicts of interest and power 
regulations.
(iv) Self-regulation, which is characteristic of  the 
functioning of markets in neoliberal contexts. 
Coordination involves highly complex relations 
between actors and systems, their substantive and 
procedural autonomy, and mutual asymmetry of 
interests. It therefore recognizes that these actors 
cannot be directed in an authoritarian way (as in 
the interventionist and corporatist model); and that 
conflicts of interest can be addressed by deliberation 
and not only through power transactions (as is the 
case in normative institutionalism). Nonetheless, 
coordination diverges from pure self-regulation (which 
is specific to the emerging market order) to establish 
general criteria for pursuing specific aims in relation 
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to problems of  public interest. Coordination is a 
balance between autonomy and coherence.
This balance seems an appropriate way to address 
the complex dynamic of  actors and systems. Two 
dimensions present themselves in this regard: one 
sociological and the other historical. The sociological 
substrate of  social coordination is found in the 
deployment of the functional differentiation process, 
namely: “The constitution of  various relatively 
autonomous functional systems, structured around 
certain internal rationales” (Lechner 1999, p. 49). Its 
historical substrate relates to the crisis in the centralized 
planning model and the European welfare state, which 
led to financial atrophy and the “juridification” of 
social domains known as “euroschlerosis” (Willke, 
1995; Peruzzotti, 1999, for the Latin American case). 
The process of functional differentiation gives rise 
to systems, organizations, and actors that question 
the State’s capacity to direct their actions through 
authoritarian planning or interventions aiming 
to define their own interests and procedures. The 
planning crisis raises the need for an alternative which, 
respecting systemic autonomy, is capable of targeting its 
operations on the parallel achievement of expectations. 
In the debate on social coordination, three candidates 
fulfilling these conditions have clearly emerged: policy 
networks (Mayntz, 1992 and 1993; Lechner, 1997; 
Messner, 1999; Scharpf, 2001; Heydebrand, 2003), 
contextual orientation through deliberation forums 
(Willke, 1995, 1997), and the reflexive law or policy 
options model (Teubner, 1993). In synthesis, as social 
coordination strategies, all of them: 
(i) Involve the capacity to introduce coherence in 
the inter-relationships between autonomous 
systems and actors, steering them towards specific 
tasks.
(ii) Develop a common vision around a problem 
area with a view to constructing positive-sum 
relations. 
(iii) Promote a tolerable level of self-limitation on 
autonomy, without this putting the core of each 
participant’s interests at stake. 
(iv) Are made operational by articulating procedures 
rather than through generalized regulatory 
principles. 
(v) Seek to increase the reflexiveness of systems and 
actors by considering the consequences of their 
autonomous operations. 
Social coordination through public policies thus 
involves a combination of two principles: firstly, the 
coherence that can provide a panoramic view of the 
interests and procedures of various systems and actors; 
and secondly, the autonomy for them to define their 
own interests and to self-organize (Scharpf, 1993; 
Mayntz, 1993; Willke, 1995). Coherence is provided 
by State view of social problems; autonomy pertains 
to systems and actors in complex situations. By 
combining the two, the aim is to create hybrid zones, 
in which public policies can promote and guide the 
production of a good or service, without this meaning 
the centrist-state intervening in autonomous systems 
and actors to achieve that. While coherence aims 
to establish coordinated efforts between the parties 
involved, autonomy seeks to enable the different systems 
and actors committed to obtain outcomes for their 
interests and to operate with their own procedures in 
most cases. Coordination through policies is, in this 
sense, a double-contingency situation (Luhmann, 
2007); in other words, both State operations and those 
of autonomous systems and actors maintain their 
differentiated expectations, but are linked concretely, 
socially and temporarily in a policy issue, from which 
they can obtain differentiated but coordinated outcomes. 
This is a positive-sum aspiration, rather than a zero-sum 
game. Social coordination, in this sense, responds to 
the integration compulsion of centrist-state planning-
based policies, while rejecting the impossibility of a 
“common view” of social problems that are relevant 
for the actors involved (Willke, 1995, 1997).
The following sections individually describe three 
coordination models: policy networks, deliberation 
forums, and reflexive law. Their functioning is 
exemplified with Chilean cases drawn from the 
last decade.
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The topic of  the inter-relationships between 
autonomous mechanisms has a long tradition in 
organizational analysis, in which dichotomous relations 
can be distinguished (Hasenfeld, 1972), action sets 
(Whetten and Aldrich, 1979) and organizational sets 
(Granovetter, 1973). When applied to the policies 
problem, this approach gives rise to the policy-networks 
model. In principle, this involves defining rules for 
fulfilling commitments between public and private 
agents, which allow for a distribution of the costs and 
benefits of a common decision or solution of problems 
—rules that require participants to voluntarily restrict 
their freedom of action in each case. This can lead to 
a model of organizational identities, competencies, 
and mutually accepted spheres of interest (Mayntz, 
1992, p. 27 and ff.). There is no single definition on 
this subject, however. David Marsh and Rod Rhodes 
(1992) distinguish between policy networks among 
communities (few participants, strongly integrated, 
with high levels of continuity and focused on one or 
two shared interests), and thematic policy networks 
(larger number of  participants, multiple interests, 
and greater conflictiveness). 
Tanja Börzel (1998) has described two fundamental 
trends in detail: the German case, which sees policy 
networks as an alternative form of coordination to the 
hierarchical control and the market; and the Anglo-
Saxon tendency that conceives of policy networks as 
a model for the State-society relationship in a given 
area. Mark Bevir and David Richards (2009) draw 
on ethnographic studies to add a third type, the de-
centred policy network, based on the traditions and 
situated agency of the participants. A similar trend is 
followed by Pater de Leon and Danielle Varda (2009) 
with their notion of collaborative policy networks, 
in which they review not only the composition of 
actors but also their degrees of institutionalization 
and discursive exchanges. 
The approach has also been extended to 
coordination problems in transnational spaces, such as 
the relation between multiple governance levels —local, 
regional, national, supra-national, global (Scharpf, 
2001; Pal and Ireland, 2009)— or to legitimizing 
topics relating to global constitutionalism (Kjaer, 
2009). Nonetheless, these trends can be defined as “a 
set of relatively stable relationships which are of a 
non-hierarchical and interdependent nature, linking 
a variety of actors, who share common interests with 
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests, acknowledging that 
cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals” 
(Börzel, 1998, p. 254).
Joop Koppenjan, Kars and van der Voort (2009) 
have clearly identified the political-sociological problem 
underlying this model. Firstly, political-democratic 
actors stress the relation between principal agents 
and political authorities, while the relevant execution 
decisions are taken at decentralized governance levels 
(private, quasi-private). Secondly, decentralized 
actors have the expertise and capacity to pursue their 
objectives (again Willke, 1995), but they find it hard to 
generate political support to avoid interventions from 
above. In this sense, a policy network can be seen as a 
linkage between the vertical nature of representative 
democracy and the horizontal nature of  multiple 
forms of governance among private actors outside 
the domain of representative democratic relations. To 
achieve this linkage, Koppenjan, Kars and van der 
Voort (2009) propose developing a framework setting 
to regulate relations between participants and define 
the procedural limits of  joint action. In doing so, 
they have to face three types of problem: complexity, 
interdependence, and the dynamic of any policy issue. 
The first of these must be overcome through a constant 
dialogue between the participants; the second, by 
considering the framework of conditions as loose 
coupling (Weick, 1976), which allows for deviations 
in response to possible contingencies; and, the third, 
through openness to learning based on the internal 
dynamic of policy implementation. 
Even in the case of loose couplings, policy networks 
contain elements that encourage their maintenance. 
One of these is mutual resource dependency: funds, 
legitimization, executive capacities, information, and 
political-institutional elements (Park, Rethemeyer and 
Hatmaker, 2009); other very important elements are 
III
The policy networks model and its 
emergence in Chile
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socio-structural resources, in other words “patterns 
of communication and resource exchange between 
three or more actors” (Hatmaker and Rethemayer, 
2008, p. 430), the stability of which depends on the 
returns accruing to the people sustaining them. 
The social capital of  the participants would also 
contribute to a better network performance and thus 
to its continuity (Sandström and Carlsson, 2008). 
Nonetheless, an essential aspect of network operations 
seems to be that they function by producing collateral 
goods —goods that the State wants to produce but it 
cannot owing to a lack of resources and expertise, and 
private agents do not produce owing to the lack of an 
appropriate framework of conditions and guarantees 
against the emergence of free riders (Willke, 1996). 
The term “collateral goods” represents a structural 
reformulation of  collective goods, whose lack of 
competitiveness discourages their production. In 
policy-network terms, collateral goods involve mutual 
(public-private) resource dependency, a framework 
for their operation, relatively stabilized patterns of 
communication and exchange, focus on a policy 
issue, and intensive use of knowledge and executive 
capacities. The infrastructure concession system in 
Chile reflects these characteristics.
Lack of  financial resources, specialized 
knowledge and executive capacity, compounded by 
the infrastructure deficit that prevailed in Chile in the 
early 1990s, were key incentives for the development 
of collateral goods in the public-works sector. Until 
the passing of  the 1996 Concessions Law (mop, 
DS No. 900), financing and execution were in State 
hands. In the late 1970s, however, outsourcing was 
introduced for the building and maintenance of 
public works, but the design and management of 
the works remained centralized (Engel, Fischer and 
Galetovic, 2001). Under the concession system, the 
public sector basically plays a regulatory role, while 
other functions are in private hands in the various 
regulatory domains: highways, airports, water systems, 
prisons, ports and others. 
As previously stated, this is a policy network 
in formation. Public and private agents are brought 
together to produce collateral goods under a specific 
regulation, in which the costs and benefits are 
distributed in a self-regulated fashion by a legal and 
deliberative framework. This consists of the relevant 
legal instruments (Concessions Law, regulation, 
mandate agreement, bidding documents, technical bid 
and award decree), standard build-operate-transfer 
(bot) type contracts, or design, build, operate, transfer 
(dbot) type contracts, and conciliation and arbitration 
commissions. While the first two of these contain 
contract award and implementation procedures, 
the latter target the disputes that may arise in the 
execution and operation phases (Figueroa, 2003). The 
deliberative space that these two mechanisms open up 
is crucial for their constitution as a policy network, 
since they afford reflexiveness to the specific legal 
framework in response to the changing conditions in 
the contractual environment. With the conciliation 
panel particularly, patterns of communication and 
exchange are stabilized between agents in response 
to disputes that arise and, if  not resolved, are heard 
by the same commission now acting as an arbitration 
commission. Both parties can appeal to the conciliation 
panel: for contractual non-compliance for reasons 
of  force majeure or destruction of  the works, for 
example, in the case of the State; or because of changes 
in services or rates, delays caused by the State, or 
suspension of the concession, in the case of private 
agents (Figueroa, 2009).
A framework of this type may seem inflexible 
for a loose coupling of actors. Nonetheless, there are 
broad margins of flexibility and strong incentives to 
form policy networks: 
(i) bot-dbot type contracts involve private agents 
acting in consortia. This does not involve direct 
outsourcing by the State; private actors self-define 
their partners and roles.
(ii) The reconciliation panel consists of “university 
professionals”, in other words experts that are 
appointed by the parties, but not necessarily 
related directly to them.
(iii) The commission decides on its own rules and 
applicable procedures, as well as its evidence, 
complaint and notification mechanisms.
(iv) Any other parties may request establishment of 
the conciliation panel. 
(v) The concession holder may choose between 
an arbitration panel or the Appeals Court of 
Santiago, if within 30 days there is no conciliation 
(ds mop No. 900 art. 36; Also Presidential 
Message No. 358-355, 2007, p. 14). 
These elements are characteristic of  policy 
networks. Firstly, knowledge is distributed in projects 
involving high levels of complexity and technological 
investment. Not only is the State aware of its limitations 
in this regard, but the formation of consortia and expert 
panels (conciliation panel) reveals the distribution 
of knowledge between private agents. Not only does 
social capital contribute to the performance of the 
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network, but also and mainly, to cultural capital in 
the form of  knowledge (Willke, 2007). Secondly, 
the self-constitution of the panel in terms of rules 
and procedures, and the flexible dispute settlement 
channels that it offers, reveal an operation based on an 
“autonomy of will” of the parties (Mereminskaya and 
Mascareño, 2005), which indicates a reflexive exercise 
of self-linkage and self-limitation on the part of the 
actors involved. Thirdly, this means that the widely 
debated issue of  contract renegotiation (Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub, 2007; Rivera, 2008; Engel and 
others, 2009) is inherent to contracts of the bot type 
and the flexible nature of a policy network. Numerous 
risks flow in them and raise the dilemma of proceeding 
or not proceeding (go/no-go), which is a problem of 
risk modelling and, hence, knowledge management 
(Ock and others, 2005). The proliferation of  side 
agreements is an outcome of this risk management, 
and the draft amendment to the Concessions Law 
was its institutionalized response. 
This amendment draws attention to certain 
constraints on consolidating a policy network. It 
proposes to create a concessions council as a consultative 
body to guide policy, and therefore, formulate meta-
decisions that involve both representatives of various 
public agencies under inter-ministerial coordination, 
and independent “specialists” from the public sector 
and concession holders, but appointed centrally by 
the President of the Republic (Presidential Message, 
No. 358-355, Art. 1 No. 2). 
Fundamental in any policy network is the 
multiplication of observations, particularly on public-
works issues that have repercussions for other fields. 
Moreover, knowledge incorporation is decisive for 
better network performance. Nonetheless, a failure to 
include private actors in the process makes governance 
relations vertical and imposes a constraint on the 
decentralized nature of a policy network. It is not only 
concession-holder representatives that are excluded 
but mainly the public affected by the works; and a 
failure to incorporate people who are potentially 
affected heightens the risk of decisions, since they 
are taken without explicitly considering the affected 
public (Luhmann, 2006). This leads to ex post reactions 
and, ultimately, higher transaction costs. 
The introduction of a Superintendency of Public 
Works to inspect service levels (Presidential Message, 
No. 1.194-356, Art. 2), is intended as a response to 
these risks. Nonetheless, policy networks require 
deliberative mechanisms as well as regulatory ones. 
Nor is much achieved by changing from an arbitrator 
in equity (árbitro arbitrador) to an arbitrator in law 
(árbitro mixto) (Art. 36). The former has a broader 
space of deliberation, since it can diverge from the 
law by drawing on interpretive norms, general legal 
principles, comparative legislation and equity. In 
contrast, the latter must adhere to the law in its ruling 
on the substance of the issue in question (Figueroa, 
2003). This excludes consideration of the network 
environment from arbitral decisions, and also the 
evaluation of international experience of these global 
issues, which is crucial for consolidating hierarchical 
policy networks.
In brief, if  the key dilemma of policy networks is 
the encounter between the vertical nature of democratic-
representative institutions and the horizontal nature 
of private forms of governance (Koppenjan, Kars and 
van der Voort, 2009), the changes proposed seem to 
stress lines of verticality rather than horizontality. 
This tends to reduce the degrees of freedom available 
to actors, and even their alternatives for participation 
in a policy network, with consequent disincentives 
to join it. If  the legislation tends to reduce degrees 
of freedom once opened up, policy networks may 
become ritualistic and ineffective as a decentralized 
coordination mechanism.
IV
The deliberation systems model: the case of 
presidential advisory commissions 
Forms of interrelationship between actors such as the 
Concessions Council, represent what are referred to here 
as deliberation systems (Beyme, 1983; Scharpf, 1993; 
Willke, 1995; Parkinson, 2006; Whitman, 2007; Dryzek, 
2009). These are commissions, councils, dialogue 
roundtables, forums, and discussion and expert panels 
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that bring together a variety of corporate and technical 
actors or agents representing the various mechanisms 
that can be affected by policy decisions. Deliberation 
systems are a constituent component of policy networks, 
but they can also be formed independently of them 
for policy discussion purposes.
Deliberation systems theoretically aim to combine 
multiple observations on the topic of  interest for 
the actors involved. They serve as a decentralized 
articulating mechanism that involves high degrees 
of  freedom in participating mechanisms, in terms 
of  substantive interests and the procedures for 
achieving them. Deliberation specifically recognizes 
this heterarchy of actors and the need for their mutual 
reference and interpolation to achieve —through an 
act of balance— commitments on the subjects within 
their competency, without this necessarily meaning a 
change in preferences, although it is certainly possible 
to refer politically to greater legitimacy (Habermas, 
2000; Ulbert and Risse, 2005). To produce this 
effect, a political system needs to possess —apart 
from parliamentary representation— mechanisms 
for procedural deliberation (not coercive, principles-
based), inclusive (open to multiple interests) and with 
consequences (in other words with repercussions 
on policy decisions) (Dryzek, 2009). The capacity 
to produce consequences may stem from direct 
participation in policy formulation (strong public 
space), or else from an indirect influence of informal 
forums on decision-makers (weak public space) 
(Janssen and Kies, 2005). In either case, elements of 
a deliberative system are a public space with minimal 
limitations on participation by institutional actors, 
or a (private) space empowered with communication 
channels with the former, more accountability 
mechanisms, and influence on decisions (Dryzek, 
2009, pp 1,385-1,386). Thus, the conditions for the 
emergence and operation of  deliberative systems 
are: (i) recognition of  a problematic situation for 
public-private actors; (ii) tolerance of ambivalence 
and initial imbalances that are only resolved through 
long-term calculated action; (iii) development of trust 
stemming from long-term interaction, acceptance of 
surprises and new options; and (iv) reflexive capacity 
to incorporate the perspectives of others into a future 
combinatory gain (Kaldor optimum), limiting the 
present maximization of benefits (Pareto optimum) 
(Willke, 1995 and 1997; Barabas, 2004). 
The coordination mechanism that prevails in 
these situations involves a contextual orientation 
that is opposed to purely hierarchical-authoritarian 
intervention, and an autarchy of actors independent 
of all contextual consideration (Willke, 1997). The 
contextual orientation in deliberation systems 
establishes the conditions and options through which 
the actors, without ignoring their own autonomy, can 
mutually orient themselves by combining options in a 
flexible framework of possibilities. In other words, they 
link principles of consistency and autonomy. In the best 
of cases, its results are: (i) feelings of internal efficiency, 
an aspect of autonomous citizenship; (ii) perceptions 
of greater government response capacity, as part of 
political legitimacy; (iii) political participation, which 
is fundamental for good representation; and (iv) civic 
commitment, community and neighbourhood identity, 
which contribute to a democratic community (Searing 
and others, 2007, p. 612). 
Nonetheless, deliberation systems should 
not be seen as an infallible solution to problems 
of  representativeness; they are subject to various 
constraints. Firstly, reflexiveness and trust in other 
actors is formed during the process. For autonomous 
actors it is not obvious that present benefits should be 
limited in exchange for future gains. In particular, if  
there is a problem involving current costs that differ 
for each individual, the tolerance of  ambivalence 
and initial imbalances will depend on the trust that 
actors place in the procedure itself  and, hence, their 
past results with deliberation systems. Secondly, 
the above leads also to the figure of a “third-party” 
—an impartial actor within the deliberation system 
or an external source of  authority. In policy-
oriented deliberation systems, this position is filled 
by a convening government agency, which restores 
centralization through ideological attributions and 
generates incentives for the impartial agent; and, 
through actors, it is always possible to have recourse 
to a specific idea of “common good” as an external 
source to sustain individual interests (Luhmann, 
2005). Thirdly, as they combine argumentation and 
negotiation rationales, one cannot invariably expect 
consensus from deliberation systems. Elements of 
argumentation, persuasion and negotiation operate 
jointly in them, and these are interpenetrated in 
communicative action (Ulbert and Risse, 2005) and 
constitute parallel targets (commitments without 
consensus) as a most likely outcome (Willke, 1996 
and 2002). 
The deliberation systems mechanism has been 
used in Chile since 1990, particularly in the form of 
advisory commissions and dialogue forums (Fuentes, 
2006), the latter particularly on human rights issues. 
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According to Carolina Aguilera (2007a, 2007b and 
2009), a distinctive feature of the Government led by 
Michelle Bachelet was its implementation under a 
discourse of “citizen participation” in the formulation 
of policy ideas. For the author, commissions in the 
Bachelet period can be classified as those aimed 
at a participatory democracy and those targeting 
public-policy efficiency. In the explicit intention of 
the government, these criteria are combined with 
three objectives: promotion of  dialogue between 
stakeholders, creation of a participation space, and 
formulation of policy recommendations (Aguilera, 
2009). The author’s evaluation of this is nuanced. 
Firstly, a vertical relation would have been caused 
if  the government processed the proposals of  the 
commissions a posteriori and only incorporated 
experts but no stakeholders in any of them, although 
consultation mechanisms existed (Aguilera, 2007b; 
Moulian, 2006). Secondly, it is recognized that 
many experts are also sociopolitical actors, and that 
the commissions made it possible, at least, to bring 
positions closer together, reach minimal agreements 
and legitimize policy recommendations. 
Her general conclusion is that: (i) they were 
effective in providing dialogue and policy-proposal 
spaces; (ii) they had a limited effect in terms of broadly 
representing interests; (iii) they included social actors 
in cases of protests (such as the Education Quality 
Commission following the student protests, or the 
Employment and Equity Commission following 
protests by subcontractors, among others); (iv) they 
allowed for a change in political style, but in general 
continued to be linked to relevant actors; and (v) 
it was political debate in Congress that ultimately 
defined the draft laws on public policies. 
Aguilera’s assessment is interesting because it 
reflects the possibilities and limitations of deliberation 
systems in the Chilean case. They are a proven 
mechanism for harnessing actors with different 
interests and operating procedures around a specific 
topic that affects them; and their incorporation is 
recognition of their autonomy. Moreover, the fact 
that the processes culminated reports shows that 
significant degrees of  reflexiveness were achieved, 
and the fact that consensus was not reached (for 
example of  the case of  education, where students 
and teachers dissented from the report) shows that a 
negotiating approach makes it more likely to expect 
an orientation towards parallel targets. Similarly, the 
trend towards expertise in deliberation systems should 
not itself be understood as technocratization; instead, 
it shows that the complexity and specialization of the 
problems currently being faced by Chile require meta-
political visions, with intensive use of specialized and 
interdisciplinary knowledge, supported by comparative 
international experiences. 
Nonetheless, the absence of  important social 
stakeholders in some cases (commissions on pensions, 
early childhood, higher education, probity) imposes 
a significant constraint for achieving higher levels 
of reflexiveness in deliberation systems, contrasting 
expert knowledge with that of the affected parties. As 
in the case of policy networks, this increases the risk 
for the sectors of the public which the decisions taken 
will eventually affect, since their direct experience is 
not incorporated. Whether owing to the logistical 
complexity of including the affected parties or the 
lack of development of corporate actors in certain 
fields in Chile, their exclusion from certain deliberation 
systems reduces the latters’ effect as a decentralized 
coordination mechanism, tending to make them more 
technocratic and reducing the plurality of perspectives 
on a given policy issue.
Nonetheless, the potentials and limitations 
of  the experience with deliberation systems in 
Chile are intrinsic to this model. In other words, 
they can contribute to policy evaluations and 
recommendations through expert knowledge and 
that of the affected parties, but they are not intended 
to replace other democratic-deliberative mechanisms 
such as parliamentary or inter-ministerial debates, and 
a classical public, mediatic or daily domain, none of 
which, for that matter, passes the most demanding 
democratic tests (Johnston and Searing, 2005; Ulbert 
and Risse, 2005). In other terms, the problems of 
the verticalization of deliberative systems stem not 
from the fact that their proposals can be discussed 
in other democratic forums, but, in the Chilean case, 
from the centralized way their members are chosen, 
the exclusion of  unorganized affected parties, or 
the incompetency of the impartial third party to be 
steer towards a balance of emerging asymmetries in 
negotiation processes, as also stressed in the empirical 
analysis made by Aguilera (2009).
The risks of  verticalization are also present 
in deliberation systems. Nonetheless, as these are 
mechanisms for coordinating systems and actors 
with high degrees of  normative and procedural 
autonomy, the balancing process that is attempted will 
always be subject to asymmetries and confrontations, 
particularly in their initial phases of development, 
such as in Chile. 
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An interesting way to address these asymmetries, and at 
the same time generate hierarchical social coordination 
mechanisms, is “reflexive law”. According to Gunther 
Teubner (1993), this consists of implementing a policy 
of options whereby the law, abandoning all-embracing 
pretensions, would produce an optional regulation 
that stakeholders can either accept or reject. In this 
framework, reflexive law is binding if  the affected 
parties decide to make it so. The underlying premise 
is that in a context of highly autonomous actors and 
systems, the law cannot oblige, integrate, or direct 
conducts; but it can serve as a way to manage disputes 
between private actors. The aim is to make the law 
more effective, by offering actors the possibility of 
feeling motivated to operate with it. 
The emergence of various supra-national private 
legal regimes is proof of this: lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, 
lex digitalis, lex financiaria, lex constructionis (Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner, 2006 and 2007). These develop 
substantive and procedural forms of self-regulation, 
which at times collide with and at other times are 
coupled to national legal systems (Mascareño, 2006a 
and 2006b). Their common feature is the formation 
of supra-national decision-making panels for dealing 
with disputes —one of these being international trade 
arbitration in lex mercatoria. This is a mechanism for 
resolving contractual disputes between private agents 
of different nationalities, although it also operates 
for disputes between foreign investors and the State. 
Its key characteristics are: 
(i) Neutrality of  the tribunal since this does not 
form part of any national structure.
(ii) Temporal efficiency by generating “tailor-made” 
procedures without higher instances for reviewing 
rulings. 
(iii) Flexibility, which stems from the principle of 
“autonomy of will” of the parties to autonomously 
define arbitrators, the place and language of the 
arbitration, deadlines, acceptable evidence and 
the applicable substantive law. 
(iv) Intensive use of knowledge, since the arbitrators 
are selected for their specialization and experience 
in the issues of the dispute.
(v) Regulatory optionality made available to 
the parties through clauses in contracts and 
treaties (Buchanan, 1988; Guzmán, 2000; 
Mereminskaya, 2005). 
Although trade arbitration has developed over 
a long period, the intensification of trade relations 
and consequent proliferation of private contracts and 
agreements between States and regions of the global 
society, over the last few decades, has introduced new 
consequences that can be analysed in public-policy 
terms. The incentive of  commercial activity and 
attraction of investments are not merely a private issue. 
The welfare consequences are also of public interest 
(employment, knowledge, infrastructure). Just as an 
unfavourable tax structure can lead investors to choose 
a foreign alternative (Agostini and Jalile, 2009), a rigid 
domestic legal regime can also discourage commercial 
activity and foreign investment (Mereminskaya, 2004). 
The law itself  then becomes a public good (Casella 
and Feinstein, 2002), whose flexibility can favour and 
its localism can restrict economic relations between 
private agents of different nationality, and between 
them and States. 
As a form of  reflexive law, arbitration is a 
mechanism that is highly adaptable to the conditions 
and various disputes that arise between autonomous 
economic agents. This gives it legitimacy among users, 
and a greater reduction of uncertainty; and it builds an 
environment that is favourable for trade and investment 
(Mereminskaya, 2005). Encouraging its use, therefore, 
cannot be excluded from policy objectives.
Since the ratification of the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1958), the Conventions of Panama (1976) 
and Washington (1965), which set up the International 
Centre for the Settlement of  Investment Disputes 
(icsid), and particularly since promulgation of the 
law on International Trade Arbitration (No. 19.971) 
in 2004, Chile has understood it in this way. This 
law is comprehensively adopted on the basis of 
the so-called Model Law, drafted by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(uncitral) and recommended to member States in 
V
The reflexive law model for the arbitration in 
trade disputes
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1985 (uncitral, 1985). Its objective is to implement 
international arbitration independently of national 
courts, as explicitly indicated in its Article 5: “In the 
matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene, 
except where so provided in this Law”. Domestic 
arbitration has a long tradition in Chile. As an 
alternative mechanism, it has seemed compatible with 
highly integrated institutional reciprocity structures 
(Mereminskaya, 2006; Xiao and Huo, 2005), and 
this may currently predispose agents towards it. 
Nonetheless, the jurisdictional restriction established 
by Law 19.971 for domestic courts necessarily entails 
a phase in which they adapt to supra-national criteria, 
and this will have consequences for the economic and 
political domain.
One of the most important parts of this adaptation 
phase is the construction by national courts of the 
notion of  public order (mandatory rules that set 
contractual limits) adapted to supra-national criteria. 
In terms of the review of rulings of annulment in the 
Court of Appeals or the recognition of foreign arbitral 
rulings by the Supreme Court, it is not possible to 
mechanically apply the domestic notion of public order, 
which is always more restrictive than its international 
counterpart, the supra-national one or that implicit in 
lex fori (Buchanan, 1988). In the international arbitral 
regime, the only non-repealable regulation is “good 
faith” (unidroit, 2004, art 1.7; Mereminskaya, 2003; 
Mereminskaya and Mascareño, 2005). 
In the domestic domain, in contrast, even Article 
16 of the Civil Code (application of Chilean laws to 
property located in the country) has been considered 
a norm of  public order (Mereminskaya, 2006). 
Application of  this criterion is an obstacle to the 
recognition of foreign arbitral rulings in Chile, which 
destabilizes, in terms of judicial practice, the politically 
and legislatively constructive institutional order that 
favours judicial linkage with a transnational order 
and, ultimately, promotes international commercial 
relations and foreign investment. Given this restriction, 
anchored in Chilean legal doctrine, it seems necessary, 
in public policy terms, to give guidance to domestic 
judicial bodies, on how to apply the aforementioned 
conventions and the implications of Law 19.971. 
As in the previous cases (policy networks and 
deliberation systems), there is both private and public 
responsibility. Accordingly, the formation of policy 
networks in this field may be very useful for greater 
coordination between the private sector and the State. 
In such a dynamic, the former are responsible for 
coordination and efficient administration of international 
arbitration in its procedural dimension, whereas the 
State would be responsible for supervision and correct 
functioning of its legal institutional framework in 
relation to inter- and supra-national criteria. This is 
increasingly necessary following the signing of multiple 
bilateral agreements over the last decade, which 
contain arbitration clauses (Direcon, 2009). These two 
dimensions are reviewed successively below.
Firstly, in the private domain, international 
commercial arbitration may be ad hoc (organized 
by the parties) or institutional (in arbitration 
centres). The first avoids the monetary cost of the 
second, but its transaction costs may be too high, 
because it requires the parties to plan the arbitration 
before the dispute arises. This encourages the use of 
institutional arbitration. This being the case, it is 
essential to structure the arbitral process efficiently 
from a procedural standpoint, giving clarity and 
simplicity to the arbitral clause (Millet, 2006), ensuring 
expertise among administrators and stability in the 
organizational conditions under which they operate. 
This includes keeping its members academically up-
to-date, presence at meetings of  the international 
arbitration community, convening capacity to at 
the institutional headquarters, and organizational 
adaptation to international quality standards. 
Since 1992 Chile has had the Santiago Arbitration 
and Mediation Centre (cam-Santiago) of the Santiago 
Chamber of Commerce, which is highly efficient in 
the national domain and now open to international 
arbitration. Other centres in Latin America have also 
grown in importance (in Mexico, Peru and Brazil). 
Given the processes of  economic liberalization in 
Latin America and the high degree of regional and 
national variability, it does not seem advisable to 
form an arbitration centre for the region, as might be 
viable in Asia (Koh, 2000). Nonetheless, institutional 
informality and the specific regulatory features 
prevailing the region remain a procedural constraint 
(Mascareño, 2006b). It would therefore seem essential 
for these arbitration centres to form policy networks, 
to enable them to exchange knowledge and experiences 
of arbitration administration, comparable procedural 
levels and transparency in their operations. This 
interaction also allows for specialization in the future 
and cooperative thematic differentiation between the 
various arbitration centres, with a constant reduction 
in opportunity/alternative costs.
Secondly, the proliferation of bilateral investment 
agreements at the State level also requires coordination 
in the form of policy networks between arbitration 
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institutions and the State agencies responsible for 
designing and supervising them. Various doctrinal and 
procedural restraints that tend to concentrate dispute 
settlement within the national legal domain can be 
addressed in this way, for example: (i) elimination 
of the Calvo doctrine (dispute settlement in national 
courts); (ii) review of  the most-favoured-nation 
clause when the laws in dispute are not stipulated 
in the bilateral investment agreement; and (iii) the 
stabilization of  umbrella clauses used in cases that 
need to reconcile differences between contract and 
treaty courts (Cremades, 2004). Lastly, the formation 
of  supra-national public-private policy networks in 
this field could result in higher levels of transparency, 
information and trust in international arbitration 
—constraints that currently exist in Chile and other 
countries of  the region, given the relatively recent 
creation of the system (in Chile this has been possible 
since 2004, with Law 19.971). An alternative to the 
above may be coordinated criteria for publishing 
rulings handed down by arbitration institutions (an 
aspect of  international arbitration that has been 
criticized (Lord, 2001; Vandenbergh, 2005)), or a 
procedure to control the consequences of  the use 
of privileged information, corruption, or family and 
friendship privileges in the public domain —common 
issues in Latin America that discourage investment 
and make the system less predictable.
In short, the dynamics generated by the 
reflexiveness of  law in Chile and Latin America 
promote the principle of autonomy among actors 
and systems, as shown in the case of international 
arbitration. The development of policy networks in 
this field is important to counteract the doctrinal 
constraints of national juridical openness to supra-
national criteria, build confidence in the model and 
coordinate the political-legislative field of  treaties 
with that of domestic judicial orders.
VI
An approach to evaluating these models
in Latin America 
Social coordination through public policies is an 
appropriate way to deal with the increasing social 
complexity of  actors and systems in the current 
Chilean, Latin American and global context. The 
high levels of  substantive and procedural autonomy 
gained by these actors is reactive in the face of  a 
vertical mode of  relationship between policies and 
publics. At the same time, autonomy involves risks 
unless it is accompanied by reflexive mechanisms 
that take account of the consequences of the actions 
of  systems and actors in the framework in which 
they operate. Autonomy also means consistency 
through reflexiveness.
Policy networks, deliberation systems and 
reflexive-law models aim to combine those two 
principles and articulate private and public actors 
and systems through negotiations, roundtables, 
exercises in which expectations are self-limited by 
external expectations, problem-oriented approaches, 
optional contracts and self-coupling, in relatively 
stable social coordination structures. Three Chilean 
cases show the effectiveness and also the limitations 
of these strategies for dealing with complex social 
contexts. The autonomy gained by various actors 
and systems in the Latin American context over the 
last few decades is undeniable; but equally clear is the 
survival of centrist-state tendencies in the sociopolitical 
matrix of Latin America, either in the form of a high 
degree of  presidentialism, corporate populism or 
authoritarian trends (Garretón, 2000). 
Moreover, conditions of social inequality also act 
against the formation of autonomous actors and open 
up spaces for constructing strong community identities 
that are resistant to deliberation or for resolving 
conflicts through coercion or corruption (Mascareño, 
2009). Under these conditions, the development of 
heterarchical coordination strategies is difficult to 
sustain. Mechanisms such as the community councils 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela aim at the 
ideological consolidation of  Bolivarian socialism, 
rather than the formation of participatory mechanisms 
for policy design and supervision (Romero, 2007). 
Something similar is happening with the constituent 
assemblies in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
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Ecuador, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia: they 
aim to legitimize a prior political construction rather 
than articulate perspectives. In addition, the high level 
of armed conflict in Colombia makes authoritarian 
forms of decision-making attractive. In contrast, the 
cronyism present in the Argentine model is resistant 
to the construction of autonomous actors; and, in 
the case of Chile — as in Brazil with its industrial 
policy sector chambers (Diniz, 1995) — while there 
are signs of relative success in the construction of 
these mechanisms, their tendency towards political 
concentration in final decision-making and the 
exclusion of potentially affected parties in some cases 
demonstrates their current limitations.
Any centrist-state trend limits the formation and 
effectiveness of decentralized mechanisms such as 
policy networks, deliberation systems, and the policy 
options of reflexive law for supra-national disputes. 
Presidentialism concentrates decisions; populism 
absorbs them in the face of institutional incapacity 
to respond to demands; and authoritarian models 
conceal them. The question in the Latin American 
case is how far these vertical political constructions 
can resist, without opening a window in response to 
the region’s growing social complexity. The effects 
of economic globalization are expressed in various 
bilateral and multilateral trade and investment 
agreements; different private agents develop their 
action strategies in regional or global terms rather 
than national ones; different actors demand their rights 
with a transnational rather than local perspective; and 
transregional mobility (to Europe, North America or 
Asia) is far greater now than it was at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
Despite its current limitations, in the Chilean 
case one can discern the incipient formation of social 
coordination mechanisms through public policies 
in the Latin American context. This seems to be a 
reasonable and necessary option for deploying such 
policies, when recourse to vertical State control proves 
inappropriate for dealing with increasing social 
complexity. Proceeding in this way has advantages both 
for the State and for private actors. Without losing the 
general orientation of thematic priorities, the former 
is partly relieved of the task of an exhaustive society 
design and increasing bureaucracy, with the investment 
of time that this involves; the second can make its 
practical and technical knowledge available to that 
design, along with its experience as parties affected by 
policies, and thereby gain recognition and autonomy 
of action. Coordination mechanisms such as policy 
networks, deliberation systems, and reflexive law 
policy options are an attractive alternative in the Latin 
American context, where traditional political structures 
are put under pressure by actors and systems that 
demand, or already exercise, autonomy and ambitions 
for participation and recognition. Nonetheless, those 
same structures restrict their realization, so tension 
is more likely than change in this regard. How that 
that tension is channelled will determine their future 
viability in the Latin American region.
(Original: Spanish)
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